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The age of international institutionalism is in twilight. International organizations
appear to be caught in a situation of equivocation. Despite successes, they are
criticised for complicity in the reproduction of global injustice and seen as removed
from local knowledges; the gaining of access is hard. Their fora seem alienated from
experienced realities; ritualized debates are frustrating, producing outcomes of the
lowest common denominator or intended obfuscation. They are unable to change
the structures of global governance rooted in the normative power of the financial
and geopolitical centers. On all of these counts, international institutions face threats
to their existence, including new challenges and competition. Democratic apathy on
one side and radicalization on the other call for reflection of the available modes of
organization and their social value.
Value can be understood pragmatically in terms of rents; structurally in terms
of innovation; and ontologically in terms of links that join valorization to social/
political/moral convictions. Blockchain technology intervenes in value production
as do international legal governance tools. As Ellul, Winner and Lessig maintain,
technologies have value production power and are always already regulation in
kind. De Filippi and Wright find that blockchain implements lex cryptographia.
Furthermore, the blockchain technology is always, in addition to being “a priori
regulation”, in a sense, a product of legal engineering and a subject of legal
regulation (however, we are not able to dissect all these dimensions and their
problems here). For many, blockchain’s social value derives from its potential to
foster freedom, neutrality, openness and transparency; or simply from the implication
that otherwise is within the possible. But Bitcoin and blockchain are not all potential;
limitations apply. And if confined to their ‘mainstream’ uses, private blockchain
systems boost efficiency in producing value in its monetary sense and reinforcing
global value chains.
What is blockchain? 
“Blockchain is a peer-to-peer decentralised database with a highly original system
for organising information and human action.” The most well-known are Bitcoin
and Ethereum. Bitcoin is digital money without third-party intermediate i.e. bank-
like institutions. The blockchain called ‘Bitcoin’ is a vast decentralized database, a
digital ledger that continuously records network transactions. It is constantly updated
with every user, each holding identical copies of it. The system requires two kinds
of users: currency users and ‘miners’. The miners provide computing power for
the use of the network to verify transactions. Identical copies and the computing
power ensure the legitimacy of the transactions, security and pseudonymity. Thus,
the technical system itself is the mediating third-party. Theoretically, Bitcoin and
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other public blockchains cannot be controlled by one party or group because of their
dispersed nature and technicality.
In 2012, a blockchain called Ethereum introduced digitized contracts, or “smart”
contracts, in which “users can decide (code) the rules for the contract, which
are automatically enforced by the blockchain”. Updating the idea of the general,
open source blockchain structure of Bitcoin, Ethereum applications include
everything from token systems (digital coins) to financial derivatives and stable-
value currencies, identity and reputation systems, decentralised file storage or
cloud computing, savings e-wallets, commodity (e.g. crop) insurances and on-
chain decentralised marketplaces. Such blockchains can automatize functions of
organisations, by managing economic rights, distributing dividends, allocating profits
or losses and storing property rights (see also applications in use/progress). The
most interesting applications are decentralised autonomous organisations (DAOs).
Organizational value of blockchain
‘Hacker ethics’ and other positive utopias rekindle certain aspirations to freedom,
neutrality, openness and transparency. “The Bitcoin ideology” emphasizes
disintermediation and a kind of radical democracy achieved through peer-to-peer
participation and decentralization, and would re-distribute the global ledgers by
which the distribution of value is recorded. The possibility of ‘money otherwise’ keeps
coming up in the blockchain communities. In these same aspirations, however, we
can also see reiterations of familiar libertarian ideals of financial organization.
Yet, the new blockchain applications have thicker contexts. Through backgrounding
the creation of new monies and seeing cryptographic coins as incidental tools for
certain organizational functions, other ideas, hopes and potentials come to view. The
‘blockchain revolution’ is an idea about creating value that derives from the assembly
of potentialities that decentralized blockchains enable. Such an assembly spawns
from ‘transindividuation’ (or forthcoming in English) – an indefinite process of re-
creation, communication, and transcendence. The technologies work as a medium
for this process by providing a complex platform structure to facilitate the on-going
form of collective being in the virtual internet space. The resulting virtualization of
reality is no linear progress narrative; it can be better understood as a hermeneutic
loop constantly to revisit the axioms and ideals of community, communication,
culture, market, etc, recursively criticizing these axioms and ideals on the basis
of so many individuated actions, with the effect of reconceiving the value/s these
axioms and ideals represent and reproduce in application. In this way, blockchain
processes aspiring to transindividuation aim at an ideal form of being and becoming
for a collective that also values the strivings of individuals.
There are many barriers to such evolution; private blockchains are spreading quickly
and mainly focus on increasing efficiency of the global giants that can best afford
them. Operations are boosted, global value chains expedited, ultraformalized
contractual relationships automatically executed en masse. Thus, technological
decentralization may lead to centralization of power on a higher level. Herian claims
that “(t)he likelihood of private businesses developing, building and maintaining
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multiple blockchain-led regulatory infrastructure projects on behalf of publicly and
politically accountable bodies in the near future is without doubt”. The consequence
being that select private parties and the private blockchains they can afford will
define “narratives of transparency and trust on behalf of public interest”. Such private
corporate blockchains tend to create distributed market environments dedicated
to individualistic competition and the reproduction of familiar market values, not
transformative platforms for social beings to flourish in transindividual collectives.
Potentialities of blockchain 
Money is “a method of representing and moving resources within a group… a way
of entailing or fixing material value in a standard that gains currency because of the
unique cash services it provides”. Moreover, a money-oriented concept of value
has effectively colonised vast non-economic areas of social life. But money is both
a product of legal engineering and a compromised medium. The legal engineering
makes its compromised condition a legal concern, the basic criteria associated with
money, namely acceptance and stability, remain ideals rather than realities. Rather
than ‘genuine’ trust, there remains a thick layer of complacency about the underlying,
axiomatic paradoxes of monetary systems and their attendant ideologies.
The definition of money as predicated on ‘acceptability for exchange’ and ‘stability of
value’ highlights the paradox that plagues the market while values change. In short,
money as we know it presumes two non-identical conditions: the acceptability for
exchange hangs on the idea that money provides a fixed standard of representation
for resource quantities, while simultaneously requiring trust in terms of collective
social psychology to uphold faith in its value. Capitalist market institutions stand
on the two legs of the material constant and the immaterial trust. But no amount of
legal engineering can make the constant and the faith stay in sync. To both insist on
the stability of the standard metric and to constantly rally for the necessary faith in
market prospering is paradoxical. The further the psycho-social trust is stretched, the
more concrete we want our currency metric to be.  
Blockchain technology enables a variety of development scenarios for the digital
political economy from reductive to radical. There are various reasons to point out
the risks of cryptocurrencies, one risk being that they do not satisfy the criteria
of currency, such as value stability. However, the value stability criterion is but
paradoxical, temporary and contingent even with fiat currencies. Indeed, if we should
accept that values change or that in a pluralist social environment it is unrealistic to
insist on a long-term fixed stabilization of beliefs, we could think of cryptocurrencies
as less controversial or even as more ‘realistic’ media within the new modes of digital
organizational architectures. It is this organizational architecture that blockchain
aims to exploit and this realism that transindividuality aims to substantiate, yielding
constantly renewed social and individual values suited to change over time.
Examples of transindividual potential are, e.g., Terra0 striving at independence from
humans by creating autonomous and automatic administration of a parcel of forest,
and DuPont’s vision of a whale saving DAO, a hybrid human-animal-algorithm-
governed organization. DuPont’s DAO saves a pod of whales by resourcing constant
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research of the pod and, in emergency, diverting resources to protection. Also, the
Economic Space Agency boasts a complex new system to allow organizations to
create their own blockchain structures or DAOs. Thus, blockchain technologies may
facilitate exchanges in open-ended community operations and fulfil all or some fiat
money functions – and those of barter and other value media more appropriate for
cooperatives. They can accentuate the non-economic purposes of social movements
and push back against the reduction of community goals and operations into a
monetary metric rod of value. Properly developed and deployed, blockchains can
foster the exchange of values and support value-based movements in ways that
traditional, centralized governance institutions (whether public or private) cannot.
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